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STEALING THE PUBLIC PURSE: WHY WASHINGTON'S
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW FOR STATE
EMPLOYEES VIOLATES THE STATE CONSTITUTION
Christopher D. Abbott
Abstract: In 2002, the Washington legislature passed the Personnel System Reform Act
(PSRA), which gives state employees the right to collectively bargain over wages and other
economic terms of their employment. Section 302(3) of the PSRA further provides that once
the Governor and collective bargaining units reach a proposed collective bargaining
agreement, the legislature may not amend the agreement. Instead, the legislature may only
express disapproval with any portion of the agreement by rejecting funding of the agreement
as a whole. This Comment argues that section 302(3) of the PSRA, now codified at RCW
41.80.010(3), violates the separation of powers doctrine under the Washington State
Constitution. The separation of powers doctrine forbids one branch of government from
invading the province of another, especially if doing so alters the constitutional system of
checks and balances. Under article VIII, section 4 of the Washington State Constitution, the
legislature holds near-exclusive power to determine how public funds will be spent. By
contrast, the Governor's check on this process is limited to the line item veto. The PSRA
turns this process on its head: the Governor determines the level of funding and the
legislature holds the veto, thus giving the Governor primacy over spending in this area. By
doing so, section 302(3) usurps one of the legislature's core functions, upsets the system of
checks and balances, and violates the separation of powers doctrine.

On June 20, 2005, Washington state government employees rushed to
union offices to pay union dues for the first time--dues required for
union membership.t By paying dues, employees could reap the
advantages of a 3.2% pay increase-beginning July 1-for union
members only.2 Non-union employees would not receive any pay
increase for an additional two months.
The events leading to this two-month windfall for union employees
culminated with legislative approval of the first-ever collective
bargaining agreements over economic issues for state employees.4 Two
1. Adam Wilson, State Workers Hurryfor Deadline,OLYMPIAN, June 21, 2005, at B 1.
2. Adam Wilson, Budget Slows Up Nonunion Pay Raises, OLYMPIAN, Apr. 26, 2005, at BI
[hereinafter Nonunion Pay Raises].
3. Id.
4. See Fiscal Matters (2005-07 Operating Budget), ch. 518, §§ 951-958, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws
2509, 2674-75 (ratifying negotiated collective bargaining agreements). Before 2004, collective
bargaining was limited to non-economic issues. See infra note 17 and accompanying text. By the
Personnel System Reform Act's own terms, the first collective bargaining agreements could not be
implemented until 2005. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.001 (2004).
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years earlier, the legislature had approved the Personnel System Reform
Act (PSRA), 5 which gives state employees the right to collectively
bargain over wages and other economic terms and conditions of
employment.6 Before the enactment of the PSRA, the legislature
determined increases in compensation for state employees through the
biennial appropriations process. 7 However, under section 302(3) of the
PSRA, now codified at RCW 41.80.010(3), the legislature cannot
modify an agreement once it is reached. Rather, the legislature must
either accept or reject funding for collective bargaining agreements as a
whole. 8
The PSRA's limitations on the legislature's power have already made
a difference. 9 The 2005 legislature accepted the 3.2% raise beginning
July 1, 2005, and the 1.6% raise beginning July 1, 2006, negotiated
between the unions and the Governor-the first agreements ever
negotiated under the PSRA. 10 At the same time, however, section 302
prevented the legislature from amending the funding for the pay raise
schedule without rejecting the entire collective bargaining agreement."
Although the legislature also funded a similar pay raise for nonrepresented employees, the limitations of section 302(3) did not apply to
employees who did not collectively bargain.' 2 Using its broader
discretion to determine the details of compensation for these employees,

5. Personnel System Reform Act (PSRA), ch. 354, 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 1800 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.80.001-.910).
6. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.80.001-.905.
7. See, e.g., Fiscal Matters (2001-03 Operating Budget), 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 7, § 719, 2001 Wash.
Sess. Laws 1820, 1957-58 (setting cost-of-living adjustments for salaries in the 2001-2002
biennium budget); see also WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (conferring the power to set spending
through appropriations to the legislature); Nancy Buonanno Grennan, Comment, A Legal Roadmap
to Privatizing Government Services in Washington State, 72 WASH. L. REV. 153, 160 (1997)
(explaining that the legislature could make decisions regarding wages for state employees).
8. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(3).
9. See Nonunion Pay Raises, supra note 2 (explaining that while the legislature honored the pay
raise schedule negotiated by public employee unions because of the PSRA's prohibition on
amending the agreement, the legislature then delayed pay raises for non-represented employees,
who were not covered by section 302(3)).

10. See Fiscal Matters (2005-07 Operating Budget), ch. 518, §§ 952-958, 2005 Wash. Sess.
Laws 2509, 2674-75. The Teamsters' master bargaining agreement is the only exception; it
provided for a larger 2.9% raise in July 2006. Id. § 955, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws at 2674.
11. See Nonunion Pay Raises, supra note 2.

12. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010 (providing for an up-or-down vote only for agreements
reached between employees represented by an exclusive bargaining representative and the
Governor).
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the legislature delayed each raise for these workers by two months. 13
This Comment argues that section 302(3) of the PSRA violates
Washington's separation of powers doctrine. Washington courts
generally find that a statute violates the separation of powers doctrine
where the statute: (1) modifies the constitutionally established system of
checks and balances; (2) acts in an area of executive-legislative relations
lacking any previous history of inter-branch cooperation in the area; or
(3) usurps a core function of another branch in the process. Section
302(3) satisfies all three criteria. First, by requiring the legislature to
approve or reject funding for collective bargaining agreements without
amendment, the statute reverses the roles of the executive and legislative
branches in the appropriations process. Second, section 302(3) attempts
to give the Governor broad powers in an area of the law where the
legislature has traditionally fought to defend its prerogatives. Finally, the
PSRA sharply detracts from the legislature's near-exclusive power to
determine the use of state funds by sharply curtailing the legislature's
role in funding collective bargaining agreements.
Part I of this Comment describes the PSRA. Part II describes the
separation of powers doctrine in Washington. Part III outlines the special
separation of powers concerns stemming from the constitution's
carefully defined roles for the Governor and legislature in the budgeting
and appropriations process. Part IV argues that section 302(3) violates
the heightened separation of powers doctrine concerning the
appropriations power.
I.

SECTION 302(3) OF THE PSRA LIMITS THE LEGISLATIVE
ROLE IN MONITORING STATE WORKER COMPENSATION

The PSRA effectively surrenders to the Governor the legislature's
role in funding state employee compensation. 14 Traditionally, the
legislature determined the level of funding for state employee
compensation in the biennial budget and delegated to executive branch
15
agencies the authority to determine the details of compensation policy.
13. See § 949, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws at 2672-73; WASH. SENATE WAYS & MEANS COMM.,
2005-07 OPERATING & CAPITAL BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS 3 (2005).

14. See WASH. REv. CODE § 41.80.010(3); Grennan, supra note 7, at 160 (commenting that the
legislature previously held the power to set appropriations for state employee compensation).
15. See WASH. REv. CODE § 41.06.150 (2002), amended by PSRA, ch. 354, § 203, 2002 Wash.
Sess. Laws 1800, 1805-08 [hereinafter Former § 41.06.150] (delegating authority to determine
wages and other terms and conditions of employment to the Washington Personnel Resources
Board); Grennan, supra note 7, at 160.
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Although "covered employees" 16 had some limited collective bargaining
rights, they could not bargain over wages.17 The legislature changed this
with the PSRA, which gives most covered employees collective18
bargaining rights over economic terms and conditions of employment.
Under section 302(3), however, the legislature also surrendered its
traditional power to regulate salary increases.1 9 For economic issues
subject to the new collective bargaining authority, the legislature may
not amend the funding for these agreements, but rather must accept or
reject funding for collective bargaining agreements as a whole.2 °
Before enactment of the PSRA, most terms and conditions of
employment for covered employees were established by legislation and
administrative rules. The Washington Personnel Resources Board
(WPRB) held rulemaking authority over much of the state civil service
system, which includes all state agencies and employees not specifically
exempted by statute, as well as all boards, commissions, and other multimember bodies.2 1 Specifically, the WPRB could promulgate rules
governing civil service examinations, employee discipline, job
classifications, salary schedules, leave, transfers, and hours. 22 The
Department of Personnel administered the system. 23 Although the law
allowed some collective bargaining, it was limited to agreements on
16. This Comment uses the term "covered employees" to refer to public employees protected by
Washington's civil service law. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.005(6) (2004) (defining "employee"
as anyone covered by chapter 41.06 of the Revised Code of Washington, with exceptions); id.
§ 41.06.900 (defining chapter 41.06 as the "state civil service law"). For a description of the specific
employees who qualify for this protection, see infra note 33 and accompanying text.
17. See Former § 41.06.150(11), supra note 15 (permitting collective bargaining only for
grievance procedures and other personnel matters for which the agency has discretion); FIFTYSEVENTH WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, 2002 FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT 8 (2002) (explaining that
agencies did not have discretion to collectively bargain over matters covered by Washington
Personnel Resources Board rulemaking, including wages and many other economic terms and
conditions of employment).
18. See WASH. REV. CODE §41.80.020(1).
19. Id. (providing that the legislature may no longer amend funding for state employee
compensation when it is presented as part of a collective bargaining agreement).
20. See id.
21. See id. § 41.06.040 (extending coverage of the state civil service law to all boards,
commissions, multi-member bodies, agencies, and agency employees not expressly exempted by
statute); id. §§ 41.06.070-.79, .82-.94 (listing employees and positions exempt from civil service
laws); Former § 41.06.150, supra note 15 (enumerating powers of WPRB to regulate personnel
procedures).
22. See Former § 41.06.150, supra note 15.
23. See FIFTY-SEVENTH WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, supra note 17, at 7-8 (describing the
division of duties between WPRB and the Department of Personnel).
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grievance procedures and other personnel matters for which the
employer-agency had specific authority to bargain.24
Despite the rulemaking delegation to the WPRB, the legislature
retained discretion to control the use of funds for state employee
compensation.25 The legislature does not adopt a line item budget.26
Instead, it historically appropriated a lump sum to the Office of Financial
Management (OFM) to cover changes in employee wages and benefits,
but would include budget provisos if it wished to further limit the
executive branch's discretion over the use of those funds.27 Before the
PSRA, then, each agency's compensation policy faced two constraints:
the limits imposed by the budget proviso, 28 and rules promulgated by the
29
WPRB.

The PSRA fundamentally altered the state's civil service laws. 30 The
Department of Personnel took over the WPRB's rulemaking authority.3 '
Collective bargaining agreements, however, could now supersede most
of the Department of Personnel's new authority-including rules
relating to transfers, sick leave, hours, and wages.32 The PSRA covers
most employees previously within the WPRB's jurisdiction, but the
PSRA also exempts employees already covered by other collective
bargaining statutes, employees connected to the agencies regulating
employment relations, internal auditors, management, and "confidential"
employees who assist or advise managers involved in labor relations
policymaking.33
24. Former § 41.06.150(13), supra note 15; Grennan, supra note 7, at 167 n. 102.
25. See Grennan, supra note 7, at 160; see also Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d
309, 321, 931 P.2d 885, 892 (1997) (explaining the legislature's ability to control spending through
the use of budget provisos).
26. See Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d at 321, 931 P.3d at 892.
27. See, e.g., Fiscal Matters (2001-03 Operating Budget), 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 7, § 719, 2001
Wash. Sess. Laws 1820, 1957-58 (allocating funds for a cost-of-living increase to OFM and using a
budget proviso to condition how the increase may be used). There was no salary increase for the
2003-2005 biennium, and the legislature incorporated the cost-of-living increase for the 2005-2007
biennium into the lump sum appropriation to each individual agency. See generally Fiscal Matters
(2005-07 Operating Budget), ch. 518, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 2509.
28. See Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d at 321-22, 931 P.2d at 892 (explaining that the legislature
traditionally used budget provisos to limit the use of lump sum appropriations to agencies).
29. See Former § 41.06.150, supra note 15.
30. See FIFTY-SEVENTH WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, supra note 17, at 10 (describing the
changes made by the PSRA as "historic").
31. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.06.150(2004).
32. See id. § 41.06.133.
33. Id. § 41.80.005(6) (defining "employee");

id. § 41.80.005(4)

(defining "confidential
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Under the PSRA, employee bargaining units and the Governor
collectively bargain over wages, hours, and other "terms and conditions
of employment., 34 The PSRA provides that exclusive bargaining
representatives (who may represent multiple bargaining units) are to
arrive at a master collective bargaining agreement with the Governor (or
her designee) that covers all employee units represented by the employee
representative. 3' The Governor must then request funding from the
legislature after the director of the OFM certifies that the agreement is
financially feasible.3 6
Section 302(3) limits the legislature's role in the process. 37 Following
OFM certification, the Governor requests funding for the master
agreement's compensation and fringe benefit provisions from the
legislature as part of the Governor's budget document.38 The legislature
must then either approve or reject funding "as a whole. 3 9 If the
legislature fails to act or rejects funding, then the employee
representatives or the Governor may either reopen the agreement or, if
the parties are at an impasse, resort to mediation.4 ° If, after approval by
the legislature, the Governor or the legislature declares the existence of a
significant revenue shortfall, the parties will immediately re-enter
collective bargaining to reduce the contract under mutually agreed
terms.4 t
In sum, section 302(3) substantially reduces the legislature's
participation in funding state employee compensation. Prior to the

employee").
34. Id. § 41.80.020(1). See FIFTY-SEVENTH WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, supra note 17, at 9, for a
summary of the specific items which may be included in collective bargaining agreements.
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(2)(a).
36. Id. § 41.80.010(3).
37. Section 302(3) provides for the following:
The governor shall submit a request for funds necessary to implement the compensation and
fringe benefit provisions in the master collective bargaining agreement or for legislation
necessary to implement the agreement.... The legislature shall approve or reject the
submission of the request for funds as a whole. The legislature shall not consider a request for
funds to implement a collective bargaining agreement unless the request is transmitted to the
legislature as part of the governor's budget document ....If the legislature rejects or fails to
act on the submission, either party may reopen all or part of the agreement or the exclusive
bargaining representative may seek to [pursue mediated negotiations].
WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(3).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. id.
41. Id. § 41.80.010(6).
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PSRA, the legislature could control compensation for state employees
through use of budget provisos. Under section 302(3), however, the
legislature loses this right because it may no longer amend the budget
proposed by the Governor to the extent the budget funds collective
bargaining agreements negotiated within the executive branch.
II.

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE PRESERVES
THE SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES

Washington's separation of powers doctrine protects the legislatureindeed, any branch of government-from intrusion into its authority that
42
undermines or otherwise upsets the system of checks and balances.
Under the Washington State Supreme Court's classical formulation of
the doctrine, courts may void any governmental activity that unduly
interferes with the independence, integrity, or prerogatives of another
branch of government.4 3 In practice, however, the court focuses its
review on activities implicating any of three factors: (1) attempts to
usurp a "core function" of a branch,44 (2) acts affecting the constitutional
system of checks and balances,45 and (3) actions without any historical
basis.46

42. See, e.g., Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 750, 539 P.2d 823, 827 (1975) (holding that the
court is to strike down laws that threaten the independence or integrity of any branch of
government); Snider v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 85 Wash. App. 371, 379, 932 P.2d 704, 708 (1997)
(invalidating a court order compelling a county commission to exercise its eminent domain power
because the order invaded a "core" legislative power).
43. See Zylstra, 85 Wash. 2d at 750, 539 P.2d at 827. At the national level, commentators have
increasingly questioned the wisdom of using a separation of powers "verbal framework" (i.e., a
framework in which government is conceived of as three distinct branches rather than a complex
network) in constitutional analysis. See, e.g., EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT 54-55 (2005)
(arguing that the use of a three-branch metaphor to describe the American system of government
has led to decisions striking down statutes for dubious reasons). Nevertheless, Washington state
courts have invoked this formulation and have enforced the doctrine to strike down legislation. See,
e.g., Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. State, 125 Wash. 2d 901, 907, 890 P.2d 1047, 1050 (1995) (invoking
the separation of powers doctrine to strike down legislation). Consequently, this Comment will
continue to employ the verbal separation of powers framework.
44. See Wash. State Bar Ass'n, 125 Wash. 2d at 907, 890 P.2d at 1050 (deciding that the
legislature's authority over the state bar association is limited because it falls within "basic"
functions of the judiciary).
45. See Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 320, 931 P.2d 885, 891 (1997).
46. See Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wash. 2d 129, 139, 882 P.2d 173, 179 (1994).
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The Washington Separationof Powers Doctrine ForbidsActs that
Undermine or Invade the Prerogativesor FunctionsofAnother
Branch of Government

Washington's judiciary officially employs a very simple formula for
evaluating separation of powers claims: while the activities of any two
governmental branches may coincide, one branch's act goes too far if it
"threatens the independence or integrity or invades the prerogatives of
[the other branch]. 4 7 The Washington State Supreme Court first
articulated this test in Zylstra v. Piva.4 8 Zylstra involved a claim that

juvenile court employees were county (as opposed to state) employees
and were therefore eligible to collectively bargain over wages and
hours. 4 9 The court agreed that the court workers were county employees

for bargaining purposes and proceeded to consider whether this
arrangement violated the separation of powers doctrine. 50 Because the
bargaining rights did not undermine the judiciary's inherent power to
compel its own funding if the compensation proved inadequate, the court
found no violation of the doctrine. 5' Although the Zyistra court found no
violation, the test it set forth has been actively enforced by Washington

courts in other contexts.
B.

Separation of Powers Applies Primarilyto Governmental Activities
thatAlter Checks and Balances,Lack Precedent,or Intrude on the
Core Functions ofAnother Branch
Although Washington courts adhere to the Zylstra test in theory, three

factors predominate the Washington State Supreme Court's separation of
powers jurisprudence

in practice.53 First, although courts generally

47. Zylstra, 85 Wash. 2d at 750, 539 P.2d at 827.
48. 85 Wash. 2d 743, 539 P.2d 823 (1975).
49. Id. at 744, 539 P.2d at 824.
50. See id.
at 748, 539 P.2d at 826.
51. See id. at 749-50, 539 P.2d at 826-27.
52. See, e.g., Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. State, 125 Wash. 2d 901, 910, 890 P.2d 1047, 1052 (1995)
(citing Zylstra and invalidating an attempt to assert executive labor-relations authority over the state
bar). Unlike its cousin, the nondelegation doctrine, separation of powers has endured as an active
restraint on government. See In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 240, 552 P.2d 163,
168 (1976). Although courts avoid interfering with disputes between the political branches, they
will step in when one branch threatens to upset the balance of power. See Wash. State Bar Ass 'n,
125 Wash. 2d at 907, 552 P.2d at 1050.
53. See, e.g., Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 320-21, 931 P.2d 885, 89192 (1997) (allowing the Governor to veto less than an entire section of a non-appropriations bill in

Collective Bargaining Agreements
tolerate 54 and even encourage 55 sharing of powers between branches,
they less frequently uphold actions that modify constitutional checks and
balances. 56 Second, courts disfavor activities that lack any history of
inter-branch cooperation. 57 Finally, courts will rarely uphold an action
that threatens to usurp a "core" function of another branch.58
1.

Courts Disfavor Changes to the ConstitutionalSystem of Checks
and Balances

Courts approach governmental attempts to alter constitutional checks
and balances with skepticism.5 9 Their suspicion derives from the
framers' belief that overlapping checks and balances-not strict division
of power into three distinct branches-best protected the people from
tyranny. 60 Consequently, both federal and state courts have been
more
61
willing to intervene when an act potentially upsets this system.
The Washington State Supreme Court has long modeled
Washington's separation of powers doctrine on the federal system.62
When the federal Constitution's framers met in Philadelphia, they relied
certain cases, notwithstanding the constitution's text, when there was a history of executivelegislative tension over use of the veto power, the legislature was trying to circumvent the
Governor's core veto authority, and the veto was part of the system of checks and balances).
54. See Spokane County v. State, 136 Wash. 2d 663, 668-70, 966 P.2d 314, 317-18 (1998)
(upholding the application of labor relations laws to district court employees despite the traditional
judicial prerogative to direct its own affairs).
55. See Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 242, 552 P.2d at 168 (emphasizing that overlapping
functions between the branches allow for the existence of the system of checks and balances).
56. See Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d at 320-21, 931 P.2d at 891-92.
57. See, e.g., State v. Wadsworth, 139 Wash. 2d 724, 743, 991 P.2d 80, 90 (2000).
58. See, e.g., Snider v. Ed. of County Comm'rs, 85 Wash. App. 371, 379, 932 P.2d 704, 708
(1997).
59. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439-40 (1998) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 951 (1983)) (striking down a line item veto law because it attacked the "finely wrought"
system of checks and balances in approving legislation); Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d at 320, 931 P.2d at
891 (upholding the Governor's veto of a subsection when the legislature attempted to circumvent
the partial veto by placing multiple provisions in a single section of a bill because the legislature's
actions threatened the "delicate" balance of the legislative process).
60. See Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 239-40, 552 P.2d at 167-68 (citing M.J.C. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 18-19 (1967)).

61. See, e.g., Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439-40 (holding that Congress may not expand the President's
veto authority); Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d at 313, 931 P.2d at 888 (holding that the Governor could veto
a subsection of a bill when the legislature tried to circumvent the Governor's veto power).
62. See Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wash. 2d 129, 135 n.1, 882 P.2d 173, 177 n.1 (1994) (using the
history of the federal constitution to interpret the Washington State Constitution); Juvenile Dir., 87
Wash. 2d at 239-40, 552 P.2d at 167-68 (same).
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on Enlightenment-era ideas about liberty in general, and those of the
Baron de Montesquieu in particular, to develop their system of
separation of powers. 63 The framers thus viewed separation of powers to
be fundamental to liberty: if any one branch could hold the powers of
another, 64
there would be fewer checks on oppressive or tyrannical
behavior.
The term "separation of powers" was then, and remains today, a
misnomer: the term actually focuses less on strict segregation of powers
into three branches and more on maintaining a vital system of
overlapping checks and balances. 65 During the Revolution, many states
attempted to incorporate express separation of powers clauses into their
constitutions, but these provisions tended to concentrate power in the
legislatures' hands.66 Acknowledging this problem, the framers of the
U.S. Constitution created three separate branches but also intended for
partial overlap of powers. 67 To the framers, overlap was not only
permissible but also inevitable.6 8 Indeed, the framers viewed some
overlap as necessary to provide checks69and balances, which were the real
guardians against concentrated power.
Later decisions interpreting the federal Constitution have sought to
implement the framers' vision. In Clinton v. New York,7° for example,
the Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act, which empowered the
president to "cancel" portions of congressional acts authorizing spending
or conferring tax benefits.7 1 The decision rested on narrow grounds.72
Nevertheless, the Court presumed that, in the absence of express
constitutional authorization, the Constitution forbids the line item veto
because it would alter the "finely wrought" procedure for enacting

63. RUBIN, supra note 43, at 44-45.
64. See Zylstra, 85 Wash. 2d at 752, 539 P.2d at 828 (Utter, J., concurring).
65. See I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.5 (3d ed. 2000); see also
Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 239-40, 552 P.2d at 167-68 (citing VILE, supra note 60).

66. Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 239, 552 P.2d at 167-68.
67. See TRIBE, supra note 65.

68. Id.
69. See Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 238, 552 P.2d at 167 (citing VILE, supra note 60).
70. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).

71. Id. at 436, 447-48. Washington courts have relied on parallel federal principles to develop the
state separation of powers doctrine. See Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wash. 2d 129, 135 n.1, 882 P.2d 173,
177 n.l (1994).

72. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 447-48 (holding that the statute directly violated the Presentment and
Bicameralism clauses of Article I, Section 7).
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laws-a procedure based on checks and balances.73
Looking to the U.S. Constitution, the Washington State Supreme
Court has adopted the same vision of the separation of powers
doctrine.74 In Washington State Legislature v. Lowry, 75 for example, the
court defended the Governor's partial veto.76 According to the court, the
Governor could veto a subsection of a non-appropriations bill--despite
the Veto Clause's plain language stating otherwise-because the
legislature tried to circumvent a partial veto by amending several statutes
in that single section.77 Turning to the appropriations line item veto, the
court permitted the Governor to veto budget provisos, reasoning that
doing so was necessary to give the appropriations line item veto any
meaning.78 The court defended its intervention, noting that if it were to
cede its role, the "delicate constitutional balance" of the legislative
process would be upset.7 9
2.

UnprecedentedIntrusions WarrantAdditionalAttention by Courts

When applying the Zylstra test to specific cases, courts consider any
history of inter-branch cooperation on the issue a highly persuasive
factor. 80 In Carrick v. Locke, 8 1 the court relied on the long history of
district court judge oversight of coroner inquests to reject a challenge to
that practice.82 Likewise, in State v. Wadsworth,83 the court looked to the
history of legislative delegation of rulemaking authority to the judiciary
when evaluating a separation of powers challenge to a statute permitting

73. See id. at 439-40 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)). Contrast the approach
used in Clinton with that in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), where the Court,
upholding delegation of power to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, emphasized that the
Constitution does not prevent overlapping or shared powers between the branches. Id. at 388-89.
74. See, e.g., Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 320-21, 931 P.2d 885, 89192 (1997); Transcript of Oral Opinion at 13-14, Wash. Fed'n of Pub. Employees v. State, No. 82-21014-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1982) (on file with author).
75. 131 Wash. 2d 309, 931 P.2d 885 (1997).
76. See id. at 313, 931 P.2d at 888.
77. Id. at 320-21, 931 P.2d at 891-92.
78. Id. at 323, 931 P.2d at 893.
79. Id. at 320, 931 P.2d at 891.
80. See State v. Wadsworth, 139 Wash. 2d 724, 736, 991 P.2d 80, 87 (2000); Carrick v. Locke,
125 Wash. 2d 129, 136, 882 P.2d 173, 177-78 (1994).
81. 125 Wash. 2d 129, 882 P.2d 173 (1994).
82. See id. at 139, 882 P.2d at 179.
83. 139 Wash. 2d 724, 991 P.2d 80 (2000).
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court officers to designate weapons-free areas of courthouses.8 4 There,
the court held that the bail-jumping statute, statutes authorizing
protection orders, and the criminal contempt statute8 5 demonstrated a
sufficiently long history of legislative delegation of rulemaking power to
the judiciary. 86 In both cases, the history of inter-branch
cooperation was
87
central to the court's separation of powers analysis.
3.

Generally, One Branch of Government May Not Usurp the Core
Functions ofAnother Branch

Generally, Washington courts will invalidate governmental actions
that usurp or invade a "core function" of another branch.88 Any action
that invades a power clearly belonging to another branch may violate the
separation of powers doctrine.8 9 When the courts have perceived
violations of this principle, they have not hesitated to intervene and
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 736, 991 P.2d at 87.
Id. at 736-37, 991 P.2d at 87-88.
Id. at 743, 991 P.2d at 90.
See id.; Carrick,125 Wash. 2dat 139, 882 P.2d at 179.

88. See, e.g., Snider v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 85 Wash. App. 371, 379, 932 P.2d 704, 708
(1997) (invalidating a judicial order requiring a county commission to exercise its eminent domain
powers because to do so would require invasion of a core legislative power). Some tension exists
between the "core functions" concept and the traditional judicial rejection of a taxonomic approach
to separation of powers questions. See Carrick, 125 Wash. 2d at 136-37, 882 P.2d at 178 (noting
that Washington does not rely on categorization of powers to determine whether the separation of
powers doctrine is violated). Notwithstanding this sentiment, however, courts-both federal and
state-maintain that certain powers clearly assigned to one branch may not be invaded by another.
See TRIBE, supra note 65. For an example of this contradiction in Washington, see State v.
Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d 652, 668-69, 921 P.2d 473, 480-81 (1996), which upheld a statute
requiring life sentences for persistent offenders because the prosecutor's discretion was not a
"legislative" power.
89. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 59 Wash. 2d 216, 222, 367 P.2d
605, 609 (1961) (holding that the legislature may not define or interpret the meaning of
constitutional provisions). This is equally true when a delegation of authority to the executive
branch faces scrutiny under the nondelegation doctrine. First, certain inherently legislative powers
may not be delegated. See, e.g., Brower v. State, 137 Wash. 2d 44, 54, 969 P.2d 42, 49 (1998)
(citing Keeting v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 49 Wash. 2d 761, 767, 306 P.2d 762, 766 (1957)) ("[l]t is
unconstitutional for the Legislature to abdicate or transfer its legislative function to others.").
Second, courts have never allowed the legislature to cede control over its core functions, regardless
of the limits imposed on executive discretion. Cf Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436-40
(1998) (holding that the Presentment Clause of the federal constitution prevents Congress from
giving the President line item veto authority even if the statute imposes substantial limits on the
President's use of that power); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183,
233, 11 P.3d 762, 794 (2000) (emphasizing that courts may review the constitutionality of an
initiative that diminishes the legislature's power even though the legislature could repeal the
limitation on its power at a later date).
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invalidate acts threatening another branch's core functions. 90
Courts have frequently applied the prohibition against usurping core
functions to prevent the legislature from taking core powers of the
judiciary. In City of Tacoma v. O'Brien,9' the court invalidated the
legislature's decision to excuse certain public works contracts for
impossibility (as authorized by statute).9 2 The legislature's findings of
fact were deemed adjudicatory and thus "exclusively judicial. 93
Moreover, the court held in Washington State Highway Commission v.
Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. 94 that the legislature could not
define terms appearing within constitutional provisions, again because
the power at issue--constitutional construction-was "exclusively"
judicial.95
Courts invariably repel attempts to nullify court rules because they
view their rulemaking authority as a "core" function.96 In Washington
State Bar Ass 'nv. State,97 the court held that a state labor relations
commission could not subject the state bar association to state collective
bargaining laws because doing so would conflict with court rules giving
the bar discretion over bargaining.98 The court held that its power over
the bar association fell within its exclusive control over court-related
functions. 99 Although the court in Zylstra held that collective bargaining
laws could apply to court employees, it maintained that the laws would
only apply to the extent that they did not otherwise intrude on the court's
internal administrative powers. 100
Washington state courts also protect the political branches from
90. See Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. State, 125 Wash. 2d 901, 910, 890 P.2d 1047, 1052 (1995);
Highway Comm "n,
59 Wash. 2d at 222, 367 P.2d at 609; Snider, 85 Wash. App. at 379, 932 P.2d at
708.
91. 85 Wash. 2d 266, 534 P.2d 114 (1975).
92. Id. at 272, 534 P.2d at 117.
93. Id.
94. 59 Wash. 2d 216, 367 P.2d 605 (1961).
95. Id. at 222, 367 P.2d at 609.
96. See Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. State, 125 Wash. 2d 901, 909, 890 P.2d 1047, 1051 (1995);
Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 748-50, 539 P.2d 823, 826-27 (1975).
97. 125 Wash. 2d 901, 890 P.2d 1047 (1995).
98. Id. at 910, 890 P.2d at 1052.
99. Id. at 909, 890 P.2d at 1051.
100. Zylstra, 85 Wash. 2d at 748-50, 539 P.2d at 826-27 (1975); see also Spokane County v.
State, 136 Wash. 2d 663, 669, 966 P.2d 314, 317 (1998) (holding that state labor relations laws
could apply to district court employees where, unlike in Washington State Bar Association, there
was no direct or unavoidable conflict with a court rule).
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judicial encroachment onto their core functions. In Snider v. Board of
County Commissioners,10 1 an appeals panel reversed a court order
requiring Walla Walla County's Board of County Commissioners to
acquire the rights of way over property, reasoning that eminent domain
is a "core function" of the board of commissioners. 0 2 Courts have also
been reluctant to order the10 legislature
to appropriate funds, barring
3
extraordinary circumstances.
In sum, courts will typically intervene whenever any of several
factors exist. First, courts are wary of attempts to alter the constitutional
system of checks and balances, particularly when it involves the
lawmaking process' "delicate" legislative-executive balance. Second,
courts will look for a history of cooperation between the branches.
Finally, courts will rarely uphold any action that invades a core or basic
function of another branch. An act faces a particularly strong challenge
to its validity when it implicates all three factors.
III. THE CONSTITUTION ENVISIONS LIMITED EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY IN THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS
The Washington State Constitution establishes a carefully defined
framework for authorizing spending.10 4 Article VIII, section 4 of the
Washington State Constitution (Appropriations Clause) requires that any
spending be approved by the legislature through an appropriations
bill. 0 5 This clause assigns to the legislature the exclusive power to set
the state's basic spending priorities.' 0 6 By contrast, article III, section 12
101. 85 Wash. App. 371, 932 P.2d 704 (1997).
102. Id. at 378-81,932 P.2d at 708-09.
103. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (1978)
(finding an exception to the general rule against requiring the legislature to appropriate funds and
compelling the legislature to spend more on education because funding is constitutionally
mandated); In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 245, 552 P.2d 163, 170-71 (1976)
(explaining that courts will normally defer to a legislative determination of the judiciary's funding
unless ordering funding is necessary to the judiciary's survival).
104. See WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (requiring that any spending from the state treasury be
approved by legislative appropriation); id. art. III, § 12 (giving the Governor a line item veto over
appropriations bills); see also Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 323, 931 P.2d
885, 893 (1997).
105. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
106. See State ex rel. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1, 3-4 (1917). This rule is
subject to a few judicially created exceptions; the judiciary may, under rare circumstances, compel
spending when spending is constitutionally required or necessary to protect the basic functions of
another branch. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 518, 585 P.2d at 95 (compelling
funding for education because of a constitutional mandate); Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 245, 552
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of the constitution (Veto Clause) assigns a limited formal role to the
Governor in the appropriations process: although the Governor may veto
budget provisos or line items and has substantial informal power to
shape the budget through persuasion and political pressure, 10the
7 Governor
may not directly change the priorities set by the legislature.
A.

The AppropriationsClause Gives the LegislatureBroad Power to
Establish the State's Spending Policies

The Washington State Constitution vests the power to authorize
expenditures of public funds with the legislature. 10 8 By preventing the
executive and judicial branches from drawing on the state treasury
without legislative approval, the Appropriations Clause assigns primacy
over spending matters to the sitting legislature.' 0 9 More fundamentally,
the clause gives the legislature broad-indeed, near-exclusive-power to
guide the state's spending priorities. 0 Moreover, the legislature holds a
correlative power to pass judgment on the merits of individual
appropriation items."'
The Washington State Constitution requires that the legislature
authorize spending from the public purse." 2 An appropriation is "an
authority from the legislature.., to supply sums of money out of that

P.2d at 170-71 (holding that the judiciary may compel funding of the court system when necessary
for the efficient administration ofjustice).
107. See WASH. CONST. art. 111,
§ 12 (defining the Governor's veto powers); Hillis v. Dep't of
Ecology, 131 Wash. 2d 373, 389, 932 P.2d 139, 147 (1997) (upholding the principle that the
executive branch may not alter the funding decisions of the legislature by spending more than
allowed by an appropriation).
108. See WASH. CONST. art. Vill, § 4; City of Ellensburg v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 709, 718, 826
P.2d 1081, 1085 (1992).
109. See, e.g., Hillis, 131 Wash. 2d at 388-89, 932 P.2d at 147-48 (executive); Juvenile Dir., 87
Wash. 2d at 248-50, 552 P.2d at 172-73 (judiciary). In addition, courts in at least some jurisdictions
conclude that past legislatures may not interfere with the spending prerogatives of a sitting
legislature, see 51 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 4, 2005 WL 1631092 (Mont. July 5, 2005) (summarizing
cases in other jurisdictions limiting the enforceability of statutes purporting to bind future
legislatures), although at least one commentator believes that in many cases the principle simply
means that a sitting legislature may freely repeal the enactments of a previous session. See Kristen
L. Fraser, Method, Procedure, Means, and Manner: Washington's Law of Law-Making, 39 GONZ.
L. REv. 447, 478 (2004).
110. Peel, 94 Wash. at 173, 162 P. at 3.
111. See Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash. 2d 191, 198-99, 235 P.2d 173, 177-78 (1951).
112. See WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; Wash. Ass'n of Neighborhood Stores v. State, 149 Wash.
2d 359, 365, 70 P.3d 920, 923 (2003) (explaining that article VIII, section 4 gives the legislature
primary control over state spending policy).
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which may be in the treasury in a given year to specified objects or
demands against the state." '13 Specifically, the Appropriations Clause
requires the following:
No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this state, or
any of its funds, or any of the funds under its management,
except in pursuance of an appropriation by law; nor unless such
payment be made within one calendar month after the end of the
next ensuing fiscal biennium ....
This provision requires that funds deposited in the state treasury be spent
only at the legislature's direction. 1 5
1.

The AppropriationsClause Gives the Legislature the Exclusive
Power to Guide Expenditures of Public Funds

The Appropriations Clause affirms legislative control over the
spending of public funds.'1 6 This clause gives the legislature the
exclusive prerogative to decide "how, when, and for what purpose"
public funds are used.' 1 7 This prerogative also includes the right to
consider the merits of individual appropriations items.' 18 Courts have
enforced legislative supremacy over spending policy on several

113. State exrel. Post-intelligencer Publ'g Co. v. Lindsley, 3 Wash. 125, 127, 27 P. 1019, 101920 (1891) (citing Ristine v. State, 20 Ind. 328, 338-39 (1863)).
114. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, §4. When exercising its power under this provision, the
Washington State Legislature generally does not appropriate funds through detailed line item
budgets; instead, the legislature enacts lump sum appropriations for each agency, while retaining
power to direct the use of funds through earmarked appropriations and budget provisos. See Wash.
State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 321-22, 931 P.2d 885, 892 (1997). The capital
budget, however, frequently uses line item appropriations. E.g., Capital Budget (2005-07 Capital
Budget), ch. 488, § 112, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 2065, 2069-70 (requiring funds appropriated to the
Washington State Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development to be used for
specific capital projects).
115. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
116. See State exrel. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1, 3 (1917).
117. State ex rel. Decker v. Yelle, 191 Wash. 397, 400, 71 P.2d 379, 379-80 (1937). The
legislature may, however, give the OFM substantial authority to regulate the use of state funds by
individual agencies in a manner consistent with the legislature's spending priorities, provided the
OFM conforms to the terms and conditions of the appropriations act. See Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wash.
2d 286, 302, 347 P.2d 1081, 1090-91 (1959).
118. See Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purseand the Line Item Veto Act, 35 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 297, 307 (1998). The right to determine funding may implicate another constitutional
provision; specifically, article 1I, section 20 of the Washington State Constitution gives each house
the right to amend bills originating in the other. Consequently, a law that prevents the originating
house from amending a bill would presumably violate the other house's rights under this provision.
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occasions.19
The Appropriations Clause gives the legislature control over the
public purse-and along with it, the power to set the state's spending
priorities. 120 The constitution aims "to prevent expenditures of the public
funds at the will of those who have them in charge, and without
legislative direction. 1 21 Consequently, the Appropriations Clause's
"central object" is to give the legislature "the exclusive power of
how, when, and for what purposes" public funds will be
deciding
22
1
spent.
Courts have respected the legislature's exclusive control over
appropriations on several occasions. 123 For example, in Pannell v.
Thompson,' 24 the Washington State Supreme Court rejected a lawsuit
seeking additional funding from the Department of Social and Health
Services for a state-administered general assistance plan for unemployed
individuals. 125 In reply to the plaintiffs' claims that they had a statutory
right to the funding, the court described the decision to fund such
programs as "strictly a legislative prerogative."' 126 Citing the same
119. See, e.g., Hillis v. Dep't of Ecology, 131 Wash. 2d 373, 388-89, 932 P.2d 139, 147 (1997)
(reversing a trial court order requiring the Department of Ecology to immediately process water
rights applications because the agency had no statutory duty to process applications beyond the
extent to which the legislature provided adequate funding); City of Ellensburg v. State, 118 Wash.
2d 709, 712-16, 826 P.2d 1081, 1083-84 (1992) (holding that a city could not recover its actual
costs for fire protection services from the state based on a statutory interpretation on the grounds
that recipients of state assistance have no enforceable rights against the state beyond the extent to
which the legislature has funded a program); Pannell v. Thompson, 91 Wash. 2d 591, 599, 589 P.2d
1235, 1240 (1979) (rejecting a lawsuit seeking additional state funding because the decision to fund
the program was a legislative, not a judicial, prerogative).
120. See Wash. Ass'n of Neighborhood Stores v. State, 149 Wash. 2d 359, 365, 70 P.3d 920, 923
(2003); Hillis, 131 Wash. 2d at 389, 932 P.2d at 147.
121. Peel, 94 Wash. at 173, 162 P. at 3.
122. Neighborhood Stores, 149 Wash. 2d at 365, 70 P.3d at 923 (quoting Peel, 94 Wash. at 173,
162 P. at 3).
123. See Hillis, 131 Wash. 2d at 388-89, 932 P.2d at 147; Ellensburg, 118 Wash. 2d at 712-16,
826 P.2d at 1083-84; Pannell,91 Wash. 2d at 599, 589 P.2d at 1240.
124. 91 Wash. 2d 591, 589 P.2d 1235 (1979).
125. Id. at 595-96, 589 P.2d at 1238-39. In Pannell, a budget proviso specifically capped the
available funding for the general assistance plan. Id. at 594, 589 P.2d at 1237.
126. Id. at 599, 589 P.2d at 1240. For other examples, see Hillis, 131 Wash. 2d at 388-89, 932
P.2d at 147 (holding that a statutory requirement to promptly process water rights applications is not
enforceable when the legislature does not adequately fund the processing agency by specifically
capping the funds available for that program), and Ellensburg, 118 Wash. 2d at 712-16, 826 P.2d at
1083-84 (holding that a statute requiring the state to contract with local governments to provide fire
protection at state facilities does not require the state to fully fund those costs). See also WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.88.290 (2004) (barring state agencies from spending in excess of their legislative
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principle, courts have strictly prevented the executive branch from
spending funds in excess of a legislative appropriation.l17
This exclusive power to authorize spending is threatened when
legislators lose the power to consider the individual merits of spending
items. 12 8 In Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 129 for example, the Washington State
Supreme Court singled out logrolling (the practice of incorporating
several unrelated measures into a single bill) as "corruptive of the
legislator and dangerous to the state."1 30 The court explained that when
several measures are rolled in to one, legislators 131
are effectively forced to
vote for measures they would otherwise oppose.
Although the Washington State Supreme Court has not found all
forms of logrolling per se unconstitutional, it does interpret the
constitution to limit the practice whenever logrolling would directly
interfere with a specific constitutional prerogative. 132 In Power, the court
invalidated a statute under the "single subject" requirement of the state
constitution.1 33 In Lowry, the court interpreted the Governor's line item
veto authority to extend to "nondollar" budget provisos precisely
because the alternative interpretation would allow the legislature to

appropriations).
127. See, e.g., Hillis, 131 Wash. 2d at 388, 932 P.2d at 147 (excusing a state agency's failure to
promptly process water rights applications due to inadequate state funding and noting that both the
state constitution and a statute bar the executive branch from spending in excess of its appropriated
funds).
128. Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash. 2d 191, 198-99, 235 P.2d 173, 178 (1951).
129. 39 Wash. 2d 191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951).
130. Id. at 199, 235 P.2d at 178 (quoting People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 494
(1865)); see also Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 329 n.13, 931 P.2d 885, 896
n.13 (1997) (recognizing that logrolling in appropriations bills undermines the legislature's
prerogative to consider each substantive matter on its own merits).
131. Power, 39 Wash. 2d at 198-99, 235 P.2d at 178; accord, City of Burien v. Kiga, 144 Wash.
2d 819, 827-28, 31 P.3d 659, 664 (2001) (holding that an initiative violated the "fundamental
principle" of the single subject rule by forcing voters who supported one measure to also support
another unrelated issue).
132. See Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d at 329, 931 P.2d at 895-96 (allowing the Governor to veto less
than a single section of a bill when the legislature attempts to circumvent the Governor's partial
veto authority because the legislature would otherwise be able to engage in logrolling); Power, 39
Wash. 2d at 198-99, 235 P.2d at 178 (invalidating an act for violating the single subject rule, a
constitutional provision designed to prevent logrolling); Blaine v. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 445,
450, 114 P. 164, 166 (1911) (invalidating a city ballot proposition that required voters to approve or
reject eight separate proposals in the same question because it undermined the people's right to vote
on each individual proposal).
133. See Power, 39 Wash. 2d at 198, 235 P.2d at 178. The "single subject" rule prohibits the
legislature from passing bills containing more than one subject. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19.
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logroll measures and undermine the Governor's veto power in the
process. 134 There, the court interpreted the constitution to preclude
logrolling when it would permit
one branch to undermine a check
35
belonging to another branch. 1
2.

The AppropriationsPower Is a ConstitutionalCheck on Executive
Power

The appropriations power operates as an important check on the
executive branch. 136 The framers of the federal Constitution recognized
its value in limiting executive power. 137 In that spirit, courts have
generally protected the legislative branch3 8 from intrusions by the
executive on its broad power over spending.
The few courts in other jurisdictions to intervene in a legislativeexecutive tug-of-war over the spending power have generally supported
the legislature. In Florida, for example, the state supreme court expressly
held that the legislature had the right to amend collective bargaining
agreements despite an express constitutional right to collectively
bargain, relying on the exclusive legislative right to appropriate funds. 139
Florida, which has an appropriations provision in its constitution
virtually identical to that in Washington's constitution, 40 has a view of
134. See Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d at 329, 931 P.2d at 895-96.
135. See id.
136. See In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 242-43, 552 P.2d 163, 169 (1976).
137. See Byrd, supra note 118, at 305-06.
138. See Transcript of Oral Opinion at 13-14, Wash. Fed'n of Pub. Employees v. State, No. 82-21014-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1982) (on file with author) (invalidating a statute ceding to the Governor
the power to make selective reductions in spending authorized by appropriations acts); see also
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998) (invalidating a statute giving the President
authority to veto line items in appropriations acts); State v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Florida
PBA), 613 So. 2d 415, 418-19 (Fla. 1992) (holding that the legislature may amend collective
bargaining agreements).
139. See FloridaPBA, 613 So. 2d at 418-19. That decision has not been immune to criticism. See
generally David M. Orta, Note, Public Employee Bargaining in Florida: Collective Bargainingor
Collective Begging?, 23 STETSON L. REV. 269 (1993) (criticizing the Florida PBA decision). Such
criticism, however, has relied heavily on the express constitutional right to collectively bargain, a
feature unique to Florida's constitution. See id. at 298-302.
140. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VII, § l(c) ("No money shall be drawn from the treasury except
in pursuance of appropriation made by law."), with WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 ("No moneys shall
ever be paid out of the treasury of this state, or any of its funds, or any of the funds under its
management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law .... "). The Washington State
Supreme Court uses jurisprudence from other states with identical constitutional provisions when
interpreting the state constitution. See Wash. Water Jet v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d 470, 493, 90
P.3d 42, 53 (2004).
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the appropriations power that has 4been favorably commented on by the
Washington State Supreme Court.' 1
In Washington, moreover, at least one court has blocked the Governor
from tinkering with the legislature's spending priorities. 142 In a Thurston
County Superior Court case, the court held unconstitutional a statute
allowing the Governor to make selected reductions in funds allotted to
agencies pursuant to an appropriation. 43 The superior court held that,
although the Governor may order uniform reductions to funding levels to
ensure that expenditures match actual revenues, the statute permitting
selective reductions impermissibly let the Governor alter the spending
priorities set by the legislature. 144
B.

Unlike the Legislature'sBroad Role in the AppropriationsProcess,
the Governor'sLegal Authority Is Limited to the PartialVeto

Although the Governor has a broader role in the appropriations
process relative to other arenas of legislation, the Governor's formal role
is nevertheless limited to the line item veto described in the Veto
Clause. 145 Although this is a legislative power, the framers intended it to
be only a limited check on the47legislature. 46 The legislature maintains
the basic power over spending. 1
The state constitution describes the executive's veto authority in the
Veto Clause:
Every act which shall have passed the legislature shall be, before
it becomes a law, presented to the governor. If he approves, he
shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to
that house in which it shall have originated, which house shall

141. See Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 329 n.13, 931 P.2d 885, 896 n.13
(1997).
142. Transcript of Oral Opinion at 21, Wash. Fed'n of Pub. Employees v. State, No. 82-2-1014-3
(Wash. Super. Ct. 1982) (on file with author).
143. See id.; Fraser, supra note 109, at 479-80 (describing the Washington Federationof Public
Employees decision).
144. See Transcript of Oral Opinion at 15, Wash. Fed'n of Pub. Employees v. State, No. 82-21014-3.

145. See Wash. State Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n v. State, 111 Wash. 2d 667, 675, 763 P.2d 442,
446 (1988) (holding that the people, by ratifying the current version of the Veto Clause, established
the precise extent of the Governor's authority in the legislative process).
146. See In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 238-39, 552 P.2d 163, 167 (1976)
(characterizing the veto power as a limited power to interfere with the legislature).
147. See id.
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at large upon the journal and proceed to
enter the objections
48
reconsider.1
If the Governor fails to act on a bill, it becomes law.' 49 The Governor
also has partial veto authority, and may veto individual sections of a bill
or specific line items of an appropriations bill.' 50 Governors may not,
however, replace the stricken text with language of their choosing. 5 '
may override the veto with a two-thirds majority of both
The legislature
52
houses.

The veto power is legislative in nature. 153 The Washington State
Supreme Court has long held that the Governor, by exercising her veto
or partial veto authority, is acting in a legislative capacity. 15 4 Unlike the
legislature, however, the Governor's ability to shape legislation is
sharply limited. The Governor may alter legislative policy only by
removing entire sections or line items of appropriations bills or refusing
to approve the bill at all.155 Additionally, while the legislature's failure to
act defeats proposed bills, the Governor's silence results in enactment of
the law. 15657 Most of a veto's power comes from its use as a "bargaining
device." 1
Although it is legislative, the veto provides only a limited power
granted for the purpose of checking the legislature. 158 As the Washington
State Supreme Court has noted, the constitution cedes only limited

148. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12.
149. Id.

150. Id.
151. Cf Wash. State Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 475, 489, 105 P.3d 9, 17 (2005) (upholding
the Governor's veto of several sections of a bill in order to enact a different primary system than the
one intended by the legislature because the Governor accomplished this result solely by removing
sections of the bill).
152. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12.
153. See In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 238-39, 552 P.2d 163, 167 (1976).
154. See, e.g., Grange, 153 Wash. 2d at 486-87, 105 P.3d at 15; State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174
Wash. 402,408, 25 P.2d 91, 93-94 (1933).
155. See WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12 (providing that the Governor may veto an individual line
item); Wash. State Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n v. State, Ill Wash. 2d 667, 679, 763 P.2d 442, 448
(1988) (holding that the Governor's veto power may only be exercised in accordance with the plain
language of the Veto Clause).
156. See WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12.

157. Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 237, 552 P.2d at 166.
158. See id. at 238-39, 552 P.2d at 167; W. LAIR HILL, WASHINGTON: A CONSTITUTION
ADAPTED TO THE COMING STATE 43 (1889) (noting that the line item veto is necessary to constrain
logrolling within appropriations bills by the legislature).
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authority to the Governor.159 The Governor's control is merely passive,
has active power to affirmatively shape the
while the legislature
60
it.1
before
legislation
In sum, the Appropriations and Veto clauses of the Washington State
Constitution define a precise balance of power between the Governor
and legislature. The legislature has plenary control over spending power.
Included in this power is the right to pass judgment on the individual
merits of spending proposals. Consequently, the legislature holds the
power of the purse with very little interference from the other branches
or even past legislatures. In contrast, the Governor has a limited role in
the appropriations process. Beyond the veto and line item veto, the
Governor generally may not interfere with the legislature's budget
priorities.
IV. SECTION 302(3) OF THE PSRA VIOLATES THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
By requiring that the legislature accept or reject collective bargaining
agreements as a whole, section 302(3) of the PSRA violates the
separation of powers doctrine. In Washington, courts frequently
invalidate governmental actions that interfere with the independence,
integrity, or prerogatives of another branch, 61 act in the absence of
traditional inter-branch cooperation, 162 or invade the "core" functions of
that branch. 63 The PSRA is vulnerable to separation of powers
challenges because: (1) it represents an invasion of the legislature's
prerogatives over spending in an area where the legislature has
traditionally defended its authority; (2) it alters the delicate balance
159. See Juvenile Dir. at 238-39, 552 P.2d at 167 (concluding that under the proper assignment
of roles, the legislature has the broad power to draft legislation and the Governor has the "limited"
power of the veto). Although the Governor has line item veto powers, this does not confer an
"active" role in the process. The line item veto is a limited tool meant to ensure fiscal restraint and
prevent logrolling. See Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 316-17, 931 P.2d 885,
889-90 (1997). Moreover, the people intended the line item veto to be the full extent of the
Governor's additional authority. See Motorcycle Dealers, I II Wash. 2d at 679, 763 P.2d at 448
(concluding that by ratifying the constitution and later amendments, the people set the precise
balance between the legislature's lawmaking power and the Governor's veto authority).
160. See Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 238-39, 552 P.2d at 167 (characterizing the Governor's

veto as limited in contrast with the broader power held by the legislature).
161. See, e.g., Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 750, 539 P.2d 823, 827 (1975).

162. See, e.g., State v. Wadsworth, 139 Wash. 2d 724, 736, 991 P.2d 80, 87 (2000).
163. See, e.g., Snider v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 85 Wash. App. 371, 379, 932 P.2d 704, 708
(1997).
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between legislative and executive power envisioned by the constitution;
and (3) it invades the legislature's core power to establish the state's
spending priorities.1 64 Specifically, the PSRA warrants invalidation for
two reasons: it deprives the legislature of the power to pass on the merits
of specific items in the collective bargaining agreements and reverses the
roles of the Governor and legislature, giving the executive primary
authority to formulate the state's spending priorities for collective
165
bargaining agreements and relegating the legislature's role to a veto.
A.

Section 302(3) of the PSRA Is Subject to Invalidationon
Separationof Powers Grounds Because ofIts Extensive Intrusion
on the Legislature'sPower over Appropriations

Section 302(3) is subject to judicial invalidation because it implicates
all three factors that the courts typically apply when considering
separation of powers challenges under the Zyistra test.166 First, section
302(3) changes the constitutional system of checks and balances
associated with the lawmaking process. 67 Second, past struggles over
control of the appropriations power reveal a lack of legislative-executive
cooperation on appropriations.' 68 Finally, the PSRA reduces the
legislature's power over spending, one of the legislature's core
functions. 169 When all three factors are present, courts will strictly
enforce the separation of powers doctrine. 7 °
1.

Section 302(3) Alters the Delicate System of ConstitutionalChecks
and Balances Related to the Lawmaking Process

Section 302(3) is subject to invalidation because it limits the extent of
the legislature's check on the Governor. 17 This is not a case where the
164. See infra Part V.A.

165. See infra Part IV.B.1.
166. See supra Part 11.B for a description of the three factors.
167. Cf State ex reL. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1, 3 (1917) (describing the
appropriations power as the "exclusive" province of the legislature).
168. See infra Part IV.A.2. Contra State v. Wadsworth, 139 Wash. 2d 724, 743, 991 P.2d 80, 9091 (2000) (upholding a statute because of an established practice of inter-branch cooperation).
169. Cf Snider v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 85 Wash. App. 371, 379, 932 P.2d 704, 708 (1997)
(invalidating legislation because it invaded the county commission's core power of eminent
domain).
170. See supra Part llB.
171. See WASH. REv. CODE § 41.80.010(3) (2004) (limiting the legislature's power to amend the
funding for collective bargaining agreements negotiated and approved by the Governor).
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legislature is merely sharing power with the executive branch. 172 Rather,
the
section 302(3) threatens to alter the delicate constitutional balance of
73
legislative process, which the courts tend to review with suspicion.
Courts generally permit the legislature to share some of its powers
with the other branches. 174 Indeed, most delegations of rulemaking
authority are upheld. 75 Section 302(3), however, takes away part of the
legislature's control over appropriations, a measure recognized176by the
framers as one of the most important checks on executive power.
177
The PSRA also upsets the "finely wrought" lawmaking process.
The people who ratified the original state constitution and later
amendments defined a precise and exclusive system of give-and-take
between the legislature and Governor. 78 The courts will therefore
intervene to keep the Governor 179 or the legislature' 80 from stepping
outside their defined roles. The Appropriations Clause makes clear,
moreover, that the legislature-and not the Governor-holds the power
of the purse.' 8' Section 302(3), however, takes some of those purse
strings from the legislature and gives them to the Governor. 82 As a
172. See In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 242, 552 P.2d 163, 169 (1976)
(explaining that the constitution is more concerned with checks and balances than with complete
separation of powers).
173. Compare Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439-40 (1998) (invalidating the federal line
item veto act because it changed the delicate balance of power between Congress and the President),
with Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 389-90 (1989) (permitting the legislature to share its
power to set sentencing ranges with a commission in the judicial branch); see also Carrick v. Locke,
125 Wash. 2d 129, 135-36, 882 P.2d 173, 177 (1994) (citing favorably the Mistretta decision and
the U.S. Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence).
174. See, e.g., Carrick, 125 Wash. 2d at 135, 882 P.2d at 177 (noting that the separation of
powers doctrine does not require the branches to be "hermetically sealed off' from each other).
175. See, e.g., State v. Wadsworth, 139 Wash. 2d 724, 743, 991 P.2d 80, 90-91 (2000)
(upholding the legislature's delegation of authority to courts to designate weapons-free areas in
courthouses).
176. See Byrd, supranote 118, at 306.
177. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439-40 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
178. See Wash. State Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n v. State, 111 Wash. 2d 667, 675, 763 P.2d 442,
446 (1988) (holding that the people established the full extent of the Governor's line item veto
authority in the plain language of the constitution and that courts must defer to their judgment).
179. See id. at 680-81, 763 P.2d at 449 (preventing the Governor from vetoing less than an entire
section of a non-appropriations bill).
180. See Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 321, 931 P.2d 885, 892 (1997)
(permitting the Governor to veto less than an entire section when the legislature deliberately tries to
circumvent her partial veto authority by including multiple substantive provisions in a single
section).
181. See State exrel. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1, 3 (1917).
182. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(3) (2004) (giving the Governor the authority to negotiate
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statute that upsets the precisely crafted appropriations process and
threatens to undermine a fundamental check on executive power, the
PSRA is vulnerable to invalidation.
2.

Section 302(3) of the PSRA Implicates an Area of the Law
TraditionallyDevoid of Legislative-Executive Cooperation

The history of executive-legislative budget relations is one of conflict,
not cooperation. 183 An absence of longstanding cooperation between the
branches may be strong evidence of a governmental act's invalidity
under the separation of powers doctrine. 184 In Washington, however, the
legislature and Governor have historically clashed over the balance of
power in the lawmaking process.1 85 If anything, the framers intended for
the executive and legislature to be at loggerheads over spending. 86 For
instance, the legislature often objects to many attempted exercises of the
Governor's veto authority-indeed, the legislature often challenges
gubernatorial vetoes in court. 187 Moreover, in the one case where the
legislature had given the Governor discretionary control over spending, a
superior court judge struck it down. 88 Finally, in other disputes between
branches, the courts have generally guarded the legislature's spending
power. 89 In sum, conflict primarily characterizes the relationship
collective bargaining agreements for covered state employees and limiting the legislature's
oversight to wholesale acceptance or rejection of the funding for the agreement).
183. See generally Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 321-22, 931 P.2d 885, 892 (describing the history
of vetoes of appropriations legislation).
184. Cf Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wash. 2d 129, 138, 882 P.2d 173, 178 (1994) (holding that when
there is a history of longstanding cooperation, that history is "prima facie" evidence of the statute's
validity).
185. See, e.g., Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d at 313-15, 931 P.2d at 888-89 (describing a conflict
between the legislature and Governor over vetoes of appropriations items); Transcript of Oral
Opinion at 21, Wash. Fed'n of Pub. Employees v. State, No. 82-2-1014-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1982)
(on file with author) (striking down a law attempting to give the Governor authority to make
selective reductions in agency appropriations under certain circumstances, in a lawsuit brought by
State Senator Phil Talmadge).
186. See State ex rel. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1, 4 (1917); Byrd, supra note
118, at 307 (characterizing the appropriations power as intended to check executive power).
187. See, e.g., Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d at 313, 931 P.2d at 888.
188. See Transcript of Oral Opinion at 20-21, Wash. Fed'n of Pub. Employees v. State, No. 82-21014-3.
189. See, e.g., Hillis v. Dep't of Ecology, 131 Wash. 2d 373, 388-89, 932 P.2d 139, 147 (1997)
(limiting the enforceability of unfunded statutory rights); In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash.
2d 232, 249-50, 552 P.2d 163, 173 (1976) (limiting the circumstances where the judiciary may
compel funding for the courts).
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between the executive and legislative branches with respect to
appropriations.
3.

Section 302(3) Implicates the Legislature'sSpending Power, a
"Core Function" of that Branch

Legislative control over spending is a core function of the legislative
branch. In O'Brien, the Washington State Supreme Court held that the
legislature may not take on functions that are exclusively the province of
the judiciary.' 90 Similarly, courts have intervened when faced with
potential intrusions into the judiciary's "exclusive" rulemaking authority
over court-related functions' 9 1 and a legislative body's "core" eminent
domain power. 192 Likewise, courts frequently describe legislative control
over appropriations as an "exclusive" power. 93 In practice, courts rarely
permit intrusions into this power. 194 Finally, legislative control over
appropriations95 is a central means of ensuring popular representation in
government. 1

Section 302(3) infringes on the legislature's core power to control
spending in two ways. First, it expands the Governor's existing rolethe veto-to a broader role in which the Governor may dictate the
96
specifics of the appropriations for collective bargaining agreements.'
Second, by preventing the legislature from amending the proposed
budget, it limits the legislature's authority to 97
determine "how, when, and
1
used.
be
will
funds
public
purpose"
for what

190. See City of Tacoma v. O'Brien, 85 Wash. 2d 266, 272, 534 P.2d 114, 117 (1975) (rejecting a

legislative attempt to assume the core judicial adjudicative function by making case-by-case
determinations of fact).
191. See Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. State, 125 Wash. 2d 901, 909, 890 P.2d 1047, 1051 (1995).
192. See Snider v. Bd. ofCounty Comm'rs, 85 Wash. App. 371, 379, 932 P.2d 704, 708 (1997).

193. See, e.g., State ex rel. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1, 3 (1917) (describing
legislative control over appropriations as "exclusive" in nature).
194. See Hillis, 131 Wash. 2d at 388-89, 932 P.2d at 147 (holding that an agency may not spend
in excess of its legislative appropriation); Transcript of Oral Opinion at 20-21, Wash. Fed'n of Pub.
Employees v. State, No. 82-2-1014-3 (holding that the Governor may not make selected reductions
to budget allotments).
195. See Byrd, supranote 118, at 305-06.
196. See infra Part IV.B.1.
197. Cf Wash. Ass'n of Neighborhood Stores v. State, 149 Wash. 2d 359, 365, 70 P.3d 920, 923
(2003) (quoting State ex rel. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1 (1917)).
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B.

PSRA Section 302(3) Violates the Separationof Powers Doctrine
as Applied to the AppropriationsProcess

Section 302(3) violates the separation of powers doctrine in two main
ways. First, section 302(3) undermines the prerogative of the legislature
to establish the state's spending priorities by forbidding the legislature to
amend compensation for unionized state employees through any means
other than outright rejection of the bargaining agreement. 98 Second,
section 302(3) reverses the traditional roles of the executive and
legislative branches, permitting the Governor to take on the core
function of setting spending priorities but relegating the legislature's role
to a very limited veto power. 199
1.

Section 302(3) EncouragesLogrolling by the Governor,Limiting
the Legislature'sPower to Set the State's Spending Priorities

Section 302(3) undermines the legislative prerogative to guide the use
of public funds. Courts will strike down acts that threaten to invade the
"prerogatives" of any legislative body.20 0 Moreover, a key component of
the power to spend is the power to guide the use of public funds.20 '
Section 302(3) limits this power by forcing the legislature to either
accept the Governor's proposed spending priorities or reject the
agreement wholesale.20 2
The Appropriations Clause clarifies the ownership of the prerogative
to spend public funds. 20 3 This clause gives the legislature near-exclusive
power over spending, and specifically assigns to the legislature the
authority to decide "how, when, and for what purposes" public funds
will be used. 20 4 For the appropriations power to serve as a meaningful
check on executive power, the legislature's actions must be more than a
"rubber-stamp. 20 5
If the legislature wishes to object to the spending on state government
198. See infra Part 1V.B.1.
199. See infra Part I.B.2.
200. See Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 750, 539 P.2d 823, 827 (1975).
201. See supra Part III.A.I.
202. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(3) (2004).
203. See WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; State ex rel. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1,
3 (1917).
111 (Cal.
204. See Peel, 94 Wash. at 173, 162 P. at 3 (quoting Humbert v. Dunn, 24 P. 111,
1890)).
205. See Byrd, supra note 118, at 307.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:159, 2006

employees negotiated by the Governor, it must reject the agreement
outright.2 0 6 Even if one element of the collective bargaining agreement
would not normally pass on its own, legislators can defeat it only if they
are willing to pay the political price attached to rejecting the entire
agreement. 207 Moreover, section 302(3) undermines the legislative
minority's right to introduce amendments to legislation, a check on
majority rule that can sometimes force supporters to either amend the act
to the minority's liking or face a politically awkward vote. 20 ' This
dilemma is exactly why courts interpret the constitution to prevent
logrolling whenever possible. 9
2.

Section 302(3) Overly Expands the Governor'sPower at the
Legislature'sExpense

Section 302(3) upsets the intended balance of power between the
legislature and Governor. Indeed, it reverses their roles: while the
Governor can establish specific funding levels and propose funding, the
legislature may only accept or reject the proposal. 210 The legislature may
not, however, give up its basic role in the lawmaking process.2'
206. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(3).
207. Cf Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 329, 931 P.2d 885, 895-96 (1997)
(expanding the Governor's veto authority to include line item vetoes of non-dollar budget provisos
because otherwise the legislature could force the Governor to approve measures he or she would
veto if standing alone); Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash. 2d 191, 198-99, 235 P.2d 173, 178 (1951)
(citing logrolling-related concerns to justify vigorous enforcement of the single subject requirement
of article 11, section 19); Blaine v. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 445, 449-50, 114 P. 164, 165-66
(1911) (holding that the people's right to pass judgment on measures is undermined when they are
forced to vote for multiple proposals in the same ballot question). For example, the legislature might
normally oppose as unfair a pay raise given to represented workers two months before nonrepresented employees, but also oppose moving the pay raise for non-represented workers two
months forward because of its expense. The legislature could not reduce funding to force a uniform
schedule for raises without rejecting an otherwise popular collective bargaining agreement.
208. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(3). In most contexts, both houses have control in the
first instance as to the extent of their power to introduce amendments. See WASH CONST. art. II, § 9
(giving both houses the power to govern their rules of procedure). While they may limit the power
to amend their own legislation, see id., the PSRA limits their power to amend legislation proposed
by an executive agency, see WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(3).
209. See City of Burien v. Kiga, 144 Wash. 2d 819, 824-25, 31 P.3d 659, 662-63 (2001)
(declaring an initiative unconstitutional for violating the "single subject" requirement of article II,
section 19 of the Washington State Constitution because it placed voters in the dilemma of having
to vote against an entire measure if they disagreed with one portion); Blaine, 62 Wash. 445, 450-5 1,
114 P. 164, 166 (1911) (concluding that a city ballot proposition requiring voters to approve or
reject multiple proposals in the same ballot question violated the "spirit" of the constitution).
210. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010.
211. See Brower v. State, 137 Wash. 2d 44, 54, 969 P.2d 42, 49 (1998) ("Ilt is unconstitutional
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Section 302(3) reverses the intended roles of the Governor and
legislature. The Governor, rather than the legislature, has primary
responsibility for formulating and proposing appropriations for state
employee compensation.212 The legislature, by contrast, has the role
normally exercised by the Governor: it may accept or reject, but may not
change, the agreement. 213 Although this veto is still a form of legislative
control over appropriations, Washington courts have held that the veto is
only a "limited" type of power, not the usual near-plenary control the
legislature is constitutionally entitled to when setting appropriations. 1 4
A textual comparison of the Veto Clause to section 302(3) shows the
extent to which the legislature's role is no more than a veto. 215 In fact,
only two differences exist. First, legislative silence defeats a bargaining
agreement 21 6 while gubernatorial silence equals acceptance. 2 7 This
difference, however, does not remedy the fundamental problem: unless it
is willing to reject the agreement wholesale, the legislature may not
evaluate the merits of any individual portion of the agreement. 2 18 In

for the Legislature to abdicate or transfer its legislative function to others ....")(citing Keeting v.
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 49 Wash. 2d 761, 767, 306 P.2d 762, 766(1957)); Transcript of Oral Opinion
at 19-20, Wash. Fed'n of Pub. Employees v. State, No. 82-2-1014-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1982) (on
file with author) (holding that the Governor may not make selective reductions to allotments to
agencies even if the legislature implemented standards limiting the Governor's discretion); cf
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998) (holding that the Bicameralism and Presentment
clauses of the U.S. Constitution prevent Congress from ceding the authority to amend the text of
laws to the President). Nor does the fact that the legislature is imposing the limitation on itself save
the statute: even if one session of the legislature may bind another, courts have rejected that
rationale as precluding a separation of powers challenge. See id. at 418-19 (striking down the
federal line item veto act even though Congress could later limit the President's authority by
repealing or suspending the law); cf.Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d
183, 233, 11 P.3d 762, 794 (2000) (holding, in the context of an initiative limiting the legislature's
authority, that the court may strike down the statutes even if the legislature could cure the restriction
on its authority by later repealing any limitation imposed on its authority).
212. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(1)-(2).
213. See id. § 41.80.010(3).
214. See In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 238-39, 552 P.2d 163, 167 (1976).
215. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(3) ("The legislature shall approve or reject the
submission of the request for funds as a whole .... If the legislature rejects or fails to act on a
submission, either party may reopen all or part of the agreement ... "),with WASH. CONST. art. IIl,
§ 12 ("Every act.., shall be, before it becomes a law, presented to the governor. If he approves, he
shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have
originated, which house shall enter the objections at large upon the journal and proceed to
reconsider.").
216. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(3).
217. See WASH. CONST. art. I1I,§ 12.
218. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(3).
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other contexts, courts zealously act to prevent this sort of logrolling.2 19
Moreover, unlike a gubernatorial partial veto, the legislature may not
excise specific portions of the funding proposed for the collective
bargaining agreements. 220 In this respect, the legislature has even less of
a check than the Governor would normally exercise over budget
legislation.2 2' Unless legislators possess the political will to reject an
entire agreement, they may not decide "how, when, and for what
purposes" public funds will be spent.222
In sum, section 302(3) is unconstitutional. It falls into the category of
measures courts traditionally disfavor: it is an unprecedented change to
the spending process, it affects the system of checks and balances, and it
imposes new conditions on the "delicate" lawmaking process.
Specifically, it creates two clear violations of the separation of powers
doctrine: (1) by restricting the power to amend funding for collective
bargaining agreements, it promotes logrolling and thereby undermines
the legislature's power to guide spending of public funds; and (2) it
invades the legislature's power to set appropriations by reversing the
traditional roles of the executive and legislative branches-that is, by
giving the Governor broad authority to determine the spending for state
employee compensation and limiting the legislature's role to a form of
veto.
V.

CONCLUSION

In its present form, the PSRA would not survive a challenge under
Washington's separation of powers doctrine. Section 302(3), which
requires the legislature to accept or reject funding as a whole for
proposed collective bargaining agreements, runs afoul of three factors
courts often use when applying the separation of powers doctrine. The
219. See, e.g., City of Burien v. Kiga, 144 Wash. 2d 819, 824-25, 31 P.3d 659, 661 (2001)
(striking down an initiative that violated the "single subject" requirement and noting that this
constitutional requirement is designed to limit logrolling).
220. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.010(3) (providing that the legislature must consider the'entire
agreement "as a whole").
221. Cf WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12 (giving the Governor authority to veto line items in
appropriations bills); Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 323, 931 P.2d 885, 893
(1997) (permitting the Governor to veto budget provisos). In fact, the power to exercise a line item
veto is also used to control logrolling. See W. LAIR HILL, WASHINGTON: A CONSTITUTION
ADAPTED TO THE COMING STATE 43 (1889). To that extent, the reversal of legislative-executive
roles also serves to increase the opportunities for logrolling.
222. See State ex rel. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1, 3 (1917) (quoting Humbert v.
Dunn, 24 P. 111, 111 (Cal. 1890)).
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PSRA upsets the delicate balance between the Governor and the
legislature in the appropriations process, it transfers power to the
Governor in an area of the law traditionally marked by legislativeexecutive conflict, and it infringes on the legislature's core function of
controlling spending policy. Specifically, section 302(3) contains two
constitutional flaws. First, section 302(3) reverses the traditional roles of
the Governor and the legislature. Second, by forcing legislators into a
dilemma of either approving an appropriations act containing measures
that would not pass if considered alone or rejecting the act wholesale, it
undermines the legislature's core power to substantively set the state's
spending priorities.
This Comment does not suggest that collective bargaining is
undesirable. To the contrary, union representation is an important means
of securing rights for public employees that their private counterparts
enjoy. Strong institutional respect for workers rights is vital to recruiting
and retaining highly qualified public servants. However, the separation
of powers doctrine is not a trivial rule; rather, it has long been regarded
as a fundamental protection for democracy. The legislature can fix this
problem by simply reserving in itself a right to amend the funding of a
collective bargaining agreement and clarifying to unions that the
agreement reached with the Governor is subject to legislative
modification (and that any such modification, of course, could always be
vetoed). By doing so, the legislature can provide a system that protects
the interests of workers without reducing the legislature's
constitutionally mandated responsibilities to the state's taxpayers.
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